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THERALD N. JENSEN, Executor of the 1 
Estate of CLARENCE ANDERSON, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HENRY 0. ANDERSON and DOROTHY 
ANDERSON, husband and wife, 
Def end ants-Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
Case No. 
11367 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an Option 
to Purchase. 
PRIOR DISPOSITION 
The case was tried to the Court in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Carbon County, the Honorable Ferdinand 
Erickson, Judge, with an advisory jury. From a verdict and 
Judgment in favor of Intervenor, the Plaintiff and Defendants 
appealed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah reversed the Judgment of the court below on the ground 
that there was no consideration to support the Option to 
Purchase Agreement. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
Intervenor now petitions the Supreme Court for a Re-
hearing seeking reinstatement of the Judgment of the Court 
below that said Option to Purchase Agreement is specifically 
enforceable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 22, 1962, one Clarence Anderson executed 
and delivered to Intervenor a certain "Option to Purchase" 
(Exhibit No. 1) whereby Intervenor was given the right to 
purchase from Clarence Anderson any or all of certain des-
cribed property owned by Anderson for prices and sums 
specified in the Option Agreement. Said Option to Purchase, 
which was drafted by Intervenor, contains the following 
language relative to consideration, to-wit: 
"Consideration: Robert Radakovich has helped me a lot 
on the place building sheds, with my selling and buying 
plus numerous other tasks all at no cost to me, which 
would be great if paid for. I have promised him a number 
of times that he should have first option and first right 
to the place at the prices listed which I think are fair to 
both of us." 
Clarence Anderson died on July 13, 1966, and Letters 
Testamentary were issued on August 9, 1966, to the Plaintiff. 
On October 11, 1966, Intervenor served upon the Plaintiff 
notice that he exercised the Option to Purchase and made 
tender of $26,975.00, being one-fourth of the purchase price 
in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff, 
as Executor of Clarence Anderson's Estate, refused the tender. 
Defendant, Henry 0. Anderson, brother of the decedent, 
also filed claim with Plaintiff, asserting a partnership interest 
with the decedent in the property covered by said Option to 
Purchase agreement. Plaintiff thereupon filed sui.t against 
Defendants seeking to determine the claim of partnership and 
to quiet title to the property involved. Intervenor, Robert 
2 
Radakovich, then intervened in said quiet title action and set 
up the Option to Purchase agreement. The Plaintiff and 
Defendants in answer to the Complaint in Intervention denied 
the validity of the Option and affirmatively alleged that there 
was no valid consideration given by Intervenor to Clarence 
Anderson to support the Option to Purchase agreement. Other 
objections were made to the Option but the matter of con-
sideration is the only issue germane to this Petition for 
Rehearing. 
The trial court found that there was consideration for 
the Option to Purchase (R 125) and entered Judgment 
accordingly in favor of Intervenor. Upon appeal by Plaintiff 
and Defendants, this Court in its decision filed on April 15, 
1970, reversed the trial court and held there was no considera-
tion to support the Option to Purchase agreement. 
Matters in the record bearing upon consideration and 
services performed by Intervenor for Clarence Anderson are 
as follows: 
(a) PLAINTIFF in his Answer to the Complaint in 
Intervention affirmatively alleged lack of consid-
eration (R 87, 100). 
(b) PLAINTIFF in his Answer to the Complaint in 
Intervention, denied that Intervenor performed ser-
vices for the decedent, Clarence Anderson, at no 
cost to the decedent (R 87, 100). 
(c) PLAINTIFF contended that such services as Inter-
venor performed for the decedent, Clarence Ander-
son, were in fact paid for (1) by decedent's per-
mitting Intervenor to run cattle on decedent's land 
in 1961 at no cost, which if paid for would have 
been worth approximately $350.00; (2) by Inter-
venor sharing in a settlement due decedent to the 
extent of approximately $100.00 sometime prior to 
3 
1962; and (3) by decedent giving a check for $70.00 
to Intervenor for labor on September 14, 1962. 
(Hearing May 20, 1968, pages 49, 54, 72; Exhibits 
No's 4, 5 and 6; Trial TR 215, 218, 219, 236, 240, 
241) 
(d) MIKE VALENTINE testified in substance that 
Intervenor helped decedent, Clarence Anderson, 
build a horse corral at Schofield, Utah (TR 15); 
that Intervenor helped build a shed approximately 
20 feet wide and 120 feet long at Miller Creek for 
Clarence Anderson in the year 1962 (TR 16, 18); 
and that decedent was present at the time, but did 
not work on the shed (TR 18). 
(e) KENNETH MARCHELLO testified that in 1960 
Intervenor helped Clarence Anderson dock and 
brand sheep at Miller Creek (TR 46, 47) ; that in 
1962 Intervenor helped build a shed approximately 
20 feet deep by 128 feet long at Miller Creek for 
decedent (TR 47) ; and that Intervenor worked on · 
said shed at least 20 or 25 different times (TR 48). 
(f) WILLIAM NIELSON testified that he observed 
Intervenor working on a shed in Miller Creek on 
Clarence Anderson's property in July or August 
1962 (TR 65, 66) ; that said sheg was about 100 . 
feet long and 20 to 24 feet deep (TR 69) ; and that 
Intervenor furnished a truck on several occassions 
to haul materials for Clarence Anderson (TR 68). 
(g) DEE ALLRED testified that Intervenor helped 
dock and brand sheep for decedent in 1960 (TR 72) .. 
(h) INTERVENOR testified that he purchased mat~c­
ials for the account of Clarence Anderson to com-
plete the shed at Miller Creek and was later 
reimbursed for such expense. (TR 242; Exhibit 
No's 4 and 14) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE UNDISPUTED SERVICES PERFORMED BY 
INTERVENOR FOR CLARENCE ANDERSON WERE 
PERFORMED GRATUITOUSLY BY OBVIOUSLY IGNOR-
ING THE EXTENT OF SUCH SERVICES AND THE 
CONSEQUENT IMPLICATION THAT CLARENCE AN-
DERSON AGREED TO PAY FOR THE SAME. 
In its opini.on the Supreme Court characterized the ser-
vice performed by Intervenor for Clarence Anderson as "var-
ious chores about the Anderson property." "Chores" usually 
refers to .odd jobs of limited scope and is so defined in the 
dictionary. Clarence Anderson was involved in a substantial 
sheep operation and business, running approximately 1000 
head over in excess of 4000 acres of range and ranch land. 
To consider lambing such a herd and the construction of a 
building 20 feet wide and 120 feet long as anything other 
than major undertakings is to ignore reality. Clarence 
Anderson was a business man who accumulated holdings 
valued at in excess of $100,000.00. As such he obviously under-
stood the work required to successfully run such an operation, 
and the record is clear that Intervenor performed substantial 
work for him which was important in the furtherance of 
such business. As this court said in Maw vs. Noble (10 Utah 
2d 440; 354 P. 2d 121): 
"A contract must be looked at realistically in the light 
of the circumstances under which it was entered into ... ", 
and in the case now under consideration, a realistic appraisal 
of the circumstances justifies the conclusion that a reasonable 
person would infer that such services as were performed by 
Intervenor for Clarence Anderson would be paid for. 
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It should be borne in mind that at the time the Option , 
to Purchase agreement was signed by Anderson, the work on ' 
the shed was going on, and nowhere does the record show that 
Intervenor had been paid for the work done to that point, 
so that realistically considering the circumstances surrounding • 
the signing of the agreement, it could most reasonably be 1 
inferred, as contended by Intervenor, that the Option was 1 
given by Anderson in payment for such services. 
The Court in its opinion cites the case of McCollum vs. 
Clothier (121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468) as compelling the con. 
clusion that the trial court was unreasonable in finding an 
implied promise on the part of Clarence Anderson to pay 
for the services admittedly performed for him by Intervenor, 
and quotes with favor the exception to the general rule, but 
which exception was held not to be applicable in the McCollum 
case on facts very similar to those now before the court. Again 
depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter, this 
court i.n M cCollum held: 
" ... it is inferred that one who requests or permits 
another to perform services for him as his agent promises 1 
to pay for them." 
In McCollum the plaintiff sought payment for services ren-
dered in sec'..lring bidders on and buyers of machinery and 
equipment sold for benefit of the defendant. This court after 
discussing the exception quoted in the opinion now under 
consideration said: 
"With such caution m mind, the test for the collrt to 
apply was: Under all the evidence, .were the circum 1 
stances such that the plaintiff could reasonably asssume 
he was to b~ paid and that the defendant should have 
reasonably expected to pay for such services. Here, the 
fact that the plaintiff had been working previously for 
the trustee in a similar capacity, for which he had been 
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paid, coupled with the request made by defendants' 
attorney and agent to continue the work, and knowledge 
of the defendant himself that the work was being done, 
are all factors which the trial judge could take into 
consideration in applying the above rule. We conclude 
that the evidence is sufficient to support these findings 
of the court that there was an implied contract to pay 
for the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services." 
In the present case Intervenor had performed services for 
Clarence Anderson prior to the building of the shed for which 
at least some payment was made; there was no association 
between the parties as would indicate that substa11tial services 
should be performed for nothing; the building of the shed in 
particular was substantial and of obvious benefit to Clarence 
Anderson; reimbursement for some expenses was made by 
Anderson ; Anderson knew of the services and assisted in 
the ordering of materials and supplies; and the Option to 
Purchase was signed while the work of building the shed 
was in progress. It is respectfully submitted that on such 
undisputed evidence, the trial court could and did reasonably 
find an implied promise to pay which was adequate and good 
consideration for the Option to Purchase. 
Further referring to 17 C.S.J. 839 cited by the court in 
its opinion it is stated that: 
"The; jury may imply a previous request from the fact 
that the service was beneficial to the promiser, when 
there is no evidence expressly negativing the request." 
In this case there is no evidence that Anderson did not request 
the services of Intervenor, and such services as were per-
formed for Andrson by Intervenor certainly were of sub-
stantial benefit to Anderson. 
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Finally, on this Point I, the reference to I Williston on 
Contracts (3rd Ed.) 631 made by the court in its opinion/to c 
the effect that: 
"A subsequent promise given and ac12epted in satisfac-. 
tion of a previously unliquidated Ii.ability arising from · 
an implied obligation to pay for a requested service is i 
supported by sufficient consideration." I 
Clarence Anderson clearly had an implied obligation to 
pay Intervenor for services and the Option to Purchase agree-
ment was given and accepted in settlement of that obligation. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO' 
RECOGNIZE THAT PAYMENT BY ANDERSON TO 
INTERVENOR FOR SERVICES ON SOME OCCASIONS 
NEGATED THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE SU-
PREME COURT THAT OTHER SERVICES WERE PER-
FORMED GRATUITOUSLY BY INTRVENOR. 
•· . i 
On one hand, Plaintiff and Defendants contend that such 
1 
services as were performed by Intervenor for Clarence Ander- i 
son were p2rformed as mere gratuities and on the other hand I 
assert that such services were in fact paid for by Anderson l 
by letting Intervenor run cattle on his land i.n 1961, by him I 
giving Intervenor approximately $100.00 out of a court settle· ; 
ment sometime prior to 1962, and by his paying Intervenor 
1 
$70.00 for labor by check dated September 14, 1962. This '
1 
court in its opinion apparently adopts the same inconsistent ! 
posititons. Payment for some services would clearly indicate 1 
that other services were also to be paid for and even if it 
1 
is contended that all services were already paid for prior to 
the signing of the Option, the undisputed facts in evidence 
will not support such a contentiton. The last payment to 
8 
/I Intervenor of any kind, other than the Option, is evidenced by 
to check dated September 14, 1962, (Exhibit 4). The Option 
was signed on September 22, 1962, (Exhibit 1), at a time 
c- . when work on the shed was still in progress and in fact con-
m · tinued for sometime thereafter. 
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As pointed out in McCollum vs. Clothier (supra), one of 
the factors supporting an implied obligation to pay for ser-
vices is the fact of prior payment under similar circumstances. 
This court relies on the law as announced in the McCollum 
case to support its decision in the case now at hand, but it is 
respectfully submitted that in so doing this court has failed 
to consider the evidence reasonably relied upon by the court 
0 
: below and has failed to correctly apply the law as stated in 
0 
McCollum to the undisputed facts before it, without even 
taking into account inferences favorable to Intervenor which 
S ' such undisputed facts would reasonably permit. 
POINT III 
i THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
h ; RULE OF "STRICT CONSTRUCTION AGAINST ONE 
DRAFTING A DOCUMENT" TO THE COMPLETE EX-
CLUSION OF THE EQUALLY VALID RULE THAT THE 
SUPREME COURT ON REVIEW MUST "REVIEW THE 
EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
ARBITER OF THE FACTS." 
1 
' 
d i 
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if 
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s j There is no dispute about the fact that Intervenor drafted 
1t 1 the document under consideration. However, the bare legal i 
e proposition that "in cases of uncertainty or ambiguity, the 
it contract will be strictly construed against the party who drew 
;o it" as announced by the court in its opinion, citing Maw vs. 
:c Noble (supra) is subject to the further propositions, also 
;o pointed out in the Maw vs. Noble case that: 
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"A contract must be looked at realistically in the light of · 
the circumstances under which is was entered into, and : 
if the intent of the parties can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty, it must be given effect." 
Further, as stated by this court in Hank vs. Hales (17 
Utah 2d 344, 411 P. 2d 836), citing numerous other cases: 
"Duly executed written documents are endowed with a ! 
presumption of vali.dity, and will be given effect unless 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence." i 
i 
The burden of thus establishing lack of consideration ! 
falls upon Plaintiff and Defendants. The only thing in the 
record to support them in such position is the claimed propo-
sition that the agreement must be construed strictly against 
Intervenor because he drew the document and the words "at 
no cost" are asserted to be ambiguous. If there was nothing 
more in the record than the document (Exhibit 1) itself, 
perhaps the rule of strict construction referred to might per-
tain, but there are considerable additional matters in evidence, 
considered by the court below, which remove any claimed 
ambiguity. The court below found from undisputed evidence 
( 1) that substantial service had been performed by Intervenor 
for Clarence Anderson, particularly in the building of the 
shed; (2) that such services were known of by Anderson 
and were of substantial benefit to him; (3) that other services 
performed by Intervenor had been paid for by Anderson in 
one way or another; and that the Option Agreement was 
signed by Anderson at a time when work for his benefit was 
going on. From this unrefuted evidence the court below con-
cluded that if the words "at no cost" were ambiguous, such 
ambiguity was resolved by all the evidence and circumstancss , 
of the case to mean that such services as were performed by 
Intervenor had not been fully paid for, that under all the 
circumstances there was at least an implied obligation of 
Anderson to pay for the same, and that the giving of the 
10 
f · option constituted such payment. However, upon appeal this 
i : court armed with the rule of strict construction referred to, 
has substituted its Judgment as to what the undisputed facts 
in evidence show and what inferences should be drawn there-
from. Such action ignores a basic rule applicable to appellate 
i procedure. As stated by this court in Charlton vs. Hackett 
1 ! (11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P .. 2d 176): 
"On appeal it is our duty to follow these cardinal rules 
of review: To indulge the finding and judgment a pre-
1 ! sumption of validity and correctness; to require the ap-
pellant to sustain the burden of showing error ; to review 
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and 
judgment and not to disturb them if they find substantial 
support in the evidence." 
Also, in McColium vs. Clothier (supra) this court stated the 
same rule of review as follows: 
The plaintiff (Intervenor) having prevailed, he is entitled 
to the benefit of the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to him, together with every inference and 
intendment fairly and reasonably arising therefrom." 
In this case the majori.ty of the court has chosen to 
substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the 
trial court. It has decided to overrule the court below upon 
the theory of "strict construction" without apparently viewing 
the substantial evidence and inferences therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the Intervenor and in support of the Judg-
ment below. To have done so is error. 
CONCLUSION 
A Rehearing in this matter should be granted and upon 
such hearing the decision of the Supreme Court should be 
11 
reversed and the Judgment of the court below reinstated.· 
Intervenor-Respondent, Robert Radakovich, hereby peititons 11 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for such relief. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
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